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ABSTRACT 
The negative effects of corruption on the economy, politics, and social conditions of 
nations have been heavily studied. A less prominent subtopic of study is the effect of corruption 
on voter turnout; specifically, in post-communist countries which are currently young and new 
democracies in the European Union (EU). Due to the countries’ unique history and relationship 
with national sovereignty, it is not clear whether corruption has a mobilizing effect on the 
population, which encourages people to vote for change, or rather has a demotivating effect, 
which discourages people from voting due to lack of hope that change will occur. This paper 
measures the effect of perceived corruption in post-communist countries in the EU on voter 
turnout in the most recent national and local elections using probit models in addition to 
attempting to mitigate endogeneity with instrumental variables using Dong and Lewbel’s (2012) 
special estimator. In additional, I will justify why corruption can be treated as continuous and run 
a two stage least squares regression. The countries studied will be Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Data 
will be used from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Life in Transition 
Survey III. Corruption is shown to have a statistically significant and negative effect on voter 
turnout even when controlling for the endogeneity in the corruption variable. 
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1     INTRODUCTION  
 After the collapse of communism, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
experienced a transformation socially, economically, and politically, which continues to shape 
the countries today. The largest political adversity amid rapid transition was the creation of 
effective governments and institutions. During the transition, some governments remained 
ineffective which prevented leaders from being held accountable for their choices and led to 
corruption. Corruption is one of the largest factors that prevents economic, political, and social 
sustainability and growth throughout the world. Most importantly, corruption in governments 
undermines democracy – the very standard post-communist countries in the EU supposedly 
strive for. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) defines corruption 
as the misuse of public authority in the interest of illegitimate gain. Corruption involves bribery 
in government for contracts and benefits, tax evasion, theft of public assets, and more.  
 In addition to prevalent corruption, the following example situation in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia illustrates a common voting trend across Central and Eastern Europe. 
After a history of inconsistent national sovereignty, from the time of World War I to Soviet rule, 
at its first taste of freedom, Czechoslovakia’s first parliamentary election in 1990 had a voter 
turnout of 96%. Almost two decades later in 2010, voter turnout in parliamentary elections in the 
Czech Republic slid down to only 62.6%. Most recently, the 2018 national parliamentary and 
presidential elections both saw a 61.9% voter turnout rate. Similarly, Slovakia's 2016 
parliamentary election only saw a 59.8% voter turnout rate. Most post-communist countries in 
the EU have seen the same downward trend, which fascinates economists and political scientists 
alike. 
 A possible reason behind the increasing voter apathy is that the democracies of post-
communist countries in the EU are very young. A distinct political feature of the Czech Republic, 
which is similar to that in the other Eastern European countries in this study, is that political 
parties have not developed into “real” political parties, such as in the United States or Germany. 
Central and Eastern European parties are small, and there are many in each government. The 
parties are not a mobilizing force and do not have many loyal supporters. “Half of all the seats in 
the Czech Parliament are now in the hands of parties that have served no more than one term in 
Parliament. Nearly two-thirds of the seats belong to parties created since the 2008 global 
economic crisis” (Haughton et al. 2017).  Multipartyism, used by Kostadinova (2007) to describe 
the many parties in Eastern European elections, has a depressing effect on voter turnout, as many 
volatile parties emerge leading to more fragmentation.  
 This view is also held by others (Ecker et al. 2016, Sikk 2012) who show that in countries 
where voters perceive high levels of corruption, corruption can create a fertile ground for 
emerging new parties. Then, new parties which run on an anti-corruption platform are shown to 
be preferred among voters. In comparison to the Czech and Slovak elections, in 2017, Austria’s 
parliamentary election voter turnout was 80% and Germany’s was 76.2%. Overall, all countries 
in this study have a similar history with similar trends in voter turnout and corruption perception, 
which could be attributed to political setups.  
 Figure 1 shows the line graph of voter turnout in national parliamentary elections from 
1990 to 2019 in post-communist countries in the EU. The clear trend is high voter turnout in the 
first few years of independence which decreases over time. After the mid-2000s, most countries’ 
voter turnout remain relatively stagnant with a slight decrease. While each country has its own 
norm regarding average voter turnout, the downward then stagnant trend can be seen across the 
countries. 
 The reason this study focuses on post-communist countries in the EU is because they are 
different from other new democracies. First, these countries have highly educated, urban, and 
mostly middle-class citizens who have the means and resources to follow and understand the 
politics of their nations. This is different from other newer democracies in the past 50 years in 
which people may not have all the tools and knowledge to make informed decisions. While 
educated, the people in post-communist EU countries have little experience with democracy and 
with the sort of issues which they are called on to have opinions about. The people of post-
communist countries were socialized under the previous regime to be at best apathetic and 
hostile to politics (Miroslawa 1990). Amid the 1990s political change, citizens were not taught 
(Figure 1: Parliamentary Voter Turnout in Eastern Europe from 1990 to 2019)
the skills necessary to monitor politicians and hold them accountable (Howard 2002). The 
transition to a market economy intensified these feelings as the tremendous and rapid changes 
created uncertainty.  
 Kostadinova (2007) explains that the high voter turnout in Eastern Europe in the first few 
years after the fall of communism is due to nationalism. She observes new democracies in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe and finds that nationalism and former communism explains the 
high voter turnout in Eastern Europe compared to new democracies in Latin America. This is 
because citizens mobilized to overthrow a foreign power to be able to have independent 
governments and elections. Furthermore, she found that the long length of foreign control in 
Eastern Europe created more immediate incentives to vote as people had not had a chance to vote 
in decades. In comparison, most new democracies in Latin American did not see as high voter 
turnout as in Eastern Europe (Kostadinova 2007). Today however, for almost the past three 
decades, Eastern European EU countries have been relatively stable and in the calmest period of 
their entire history. This could also make people complacent, feeling, that even without their 
vote, the country will be stable. 
2     LITERATURE REVIEW  
 There are few studies (Miles 2015, Sundström and Stockemer 2015, Stockemer et al. 
2013, Inman and Andrews 2010, Kostadinova 2009, Ecker et al. 2016, Olsson 2014, Pacek 1994) 
that directly measure the effect of corruption on voter turnout. There has not been a study that 
directly measures the effect of corruption on voter turnout in post-communist EU countries, 
which have a similar history with corruption, regime change, and are new democracies. 
Furthermore, there has not been a study that attempts to mitigate the endogeneity in the 
commonly used ordinal corruption perception variable. 
 Using national surveys and creating a cross-national panel of thirty-five advanced 
democracies, Miles (2015) finds that in governments that control corruption, govern effectively, 
and have fair judicial processes, voter turnout is greater. He explains that voting is a type of 
endorsement of the current people in power. Miles uses the rule of law, control of corruption, and 
government effectiveness indicators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank 
to measure the fairness of institutions. He controls for national conditions that may influence 
voter turnout, including compulsory voting laws, quality of democracy, length of democracy, 
number of parties, electoral fairness, socio-economic development, electoral competitiveness, 
and procedural fairness. While his study concludes fairness does influence voter turnout, the 
study is on a macroeconomic scale and uses a single corruption perception value per country. My 
study will focus on individual-level determinants of voter turnout, individual corruption 
perceptions, and focuses on one region. 
 Aksel Sundström and Daniel Stockemer (2015) study the impact of corruption 
perceptions on voter turnout in the most recent national legislative election across 170 European 
regions within 18 countries. Their study is on a macroeconomic scale and lumps Western and 
Eastern European countries together. They use the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 
from the year 2009 to 2015, which was a survey directly given to 34,000 citizens in the 18 
studied countries. Using regional perceived corruption of government services and the election 
process, they find that regional quality of government positively impacts regional voter turnout. 
The authors use regions rather than countries because there could be more variety in perceived 
corruption within a country than between countries in Europe. Regional turnout rates vary within 
each country by an average of 10%. The authors conduct a Hierarchal Linear Model and control 
for five variables (compulsory voting, electoral system type, presidentialism, official voting age, 
and years of EU membership) in addition to regional socioeconomic and political factors 
(economic development, economic growth, population density, and closeness of election). For 
voter turnout, they use the European Election Database. In conclusion, they find that there is a 
strong negative correlation between voter turnout and perceived corruption. Corruption is 
assumed to decrease the value of the civic duty of voting. While Sundstrom and Stockemer study 
the effect of regional perceived corruption on regional voting, they do so on a macroeconomic 
level. In my study I will also study the effect of regional perceived corruption on regional voting, 
however, on an individual level. 
 Kostelka and Blais (2018) attempt to answer the “chicken or egg question” - whether 
satisfaction with democracy affects voter turnout, or if voter turnout affects satisfaction with 
democracy. With survey data from 24 panel studies, they find that voter turnout affects 
satisfaction with democracy, and voter turnout is also determined by election type, electoral 
system, and election outcomes. Their research greatly contributes to the idea that elections have a 
legitimizing effect, adding to the literature on the importance of voting in democracies. They 
show that voting itself increases the satisfaction of all voters, regardless of outcome. 
 Daniel Stockemer, Bernadette LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs (2013) research the impact 
of corruption on voter turnout in democracies around the world. The authors assess democracies 
and their relationship with corruption on a broad scale. Their study uses data from a variety of 
countries from regions all around the world and therefore does not pay a great deal of attention to 
their unique conditions. Stockemer et al. define corruption as the abuse of public office for 
private gain and argue that corruption undermines the basic principles of free states. Using 
instrumental variable regressions, they conclude that corruption has a negative effect on voter 
turnout; the greater perceived corruption there is, the lower the percentage of voters who turn up 
at polls. 
 Stockemer et al. (2013) use the Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) as a measure for corruption and voter turnout for 70 democracies from 1984 to 2009. 
They used Blais’s (2008) baseline model for measuring voter turnout which is derived from 
Jackman (1987) and Powell (1982) and add corruption. The institutional factors included in their 
model are compulsory voting laws, electoral system type, and decisiveness of the election. The 
decisiveness of the election variable was added as it was found that more important elections 
cause higher voter turnout (Blaise and Dobrzynska, 1998). Country size was also added to the 
model, as it was found that size has a negative effect on voter turnout in large countries (Blaise 
2006). Competitiveness of the election is also included, as close elections could have higher 
voter turnout (Powell 1986). Close races also attract greater media coverage, which helps attract 
a greater number of voters (Fauvelle-Aymar and Abel 2006). Stockemer et al. find that countries 
with lower corruption have a 15% higher voter turnout. Using a Hausman test, they find that the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity can be rejected, which means a reverse causation could possibly be 
causing bias in OLS. Therefore, they use an instrumental variable regression to address reversed 
causation. The instrument is a country’s GDP and its level of democracy.  
Stockemer et al. (2013) show that corruption has a statistically significant and substantial 
negative effect on voter turnout in the 70 democracies studied. For every point increase in 
control of corruption, turnout increases by more than six points if all other variables are constant. 
They conclude that very corrupt democracies have 20% to 30% fewer citizens voting on average. 
Similarly, Stockemer (2009) also finds that the age of a country’s democracy affects voter 
turnout, which is why this study only includes post-communist countries in the EU which have 
become democracies at approximately the same time. While Stockemer et al.’s study is well 
known among corruption and voting research, it is on a macroeconomic scale and includes 
democracies from various regions in the world. 
 In a more recent meta-analysis of aggregate research, Stockemer (2017) attempts to find 
what macroeconomic factors affect voter turnout. He finds that the importance of an election and 
if an election is held in a small country influences voter turnout most. Of course, compulsory 
voting, he finds, also increases voter turnout. Most other macroeconomic predictor variables, 
including the type of electoral system, the number of parties, development, income inequality, 
and electoral closeness are inconclusive. Stockemer concludes that voter turnout is more 
complex than what most studies find, and it is most likely context dependent. 
 There is contradicting literature on the effect of corruption as a mobilizing force. Karahan 
et al. (2006) find that in the US, counties where candidates made promises for particular interests 
and promised favors had more people turning out to vote. Inman and Andrews (2015) also come 
to the conclusion that in Senegal voter turnout increases when there is greater perceived 
corruption. These two studies, however, are very geographically specific and the patterns found 
may not apply to other regions. On an even more extreme, Escalaras et al. (2012) argue that in 
very corrupt societies, voters can be bought because “corruption increases the value of office-
holding, and so it increases the demand for votes on the part of the incumbents eating to retain 
their profitable position of political power” (Kaharan 2006). This encourages corrupt 
governments to push for higher voter turnout. These extreme conditions do not apply to modern 
post-communist EU countries.  
 Turning to Central and Eastern Europe, Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker (2009) study 
voter turnout in 19 post-communist countries and attempt to find the reason behind the 
fluctuating voter turnout over a 15-year period. They look for three explanations - a “depressing 
disenchantment” scenario in which voters are less likely to vote when political and economic 
conditions are worse, a “motivating disenchantment” scenario in which voters are more likely to 
vote when conditions are worse, and a “stakes” hypothesis in which voters are more likely to 
vote in more important elections. They utilize aggregate-level cross-national time-series data of 
137 presidential and parliamentary elections and find the strongest evidence for the stakes-based 
hypothesis in explaining variation in voter turnout. They notice that turnout is highest in 
countries with the fewest constraints on policymaking, and when an election is more important. 
This study contributes to the literature by being one of the few to test corruption and voting using 
time-series regressions, and specifically focuses on post-communist Europe. 
 Kostadinova (2009) examines the relationship between corruption and voter turnout in a 
variety of post-communist countries and discovers that there is a negative relationship between 
voter turnout and corruption. She points out that while corruption initially mobilizes voters, 
eventually the positive relationship becomes negative as people begin to further distrust the 
government and lose hope. Her paper examines eight post-communist countries, some of which 
are not part of the EU. Research limited to new democracies that are post-communist and current 
EU members has not been done, as EU members are supposed to maintain a certain democratic 
standard.  
 Ecker et al. (2016) attempt to determine whether people vote for government parties that 
turn a blind eye to or engage in corrupt practices. Using data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems, Ecker et al. study the individual voting behaviors of individuals in 20 
different Western and Central European countries. Their binary dependent variable is zero if the 
individual casts a vote for an opposition party, and one if the individual casts a vote for the 
incumbent party. The key independent variable is ordinal, based on a survey question asking 
respondents how widespread they believe corruption is among politicians. Besides exogenous 
control variables regarding a person’s background, the researchers also ask about political 
affiliation. They include a variable for each country’s Corruption Perception Index published by 
Transparency International. Ecker et al. find that voters who perceive a high level of corruption 
punish incumbents. However, this mostly applies to people who are non-partisan - people who 
do not have an affiliation with a specific political party. Overall, corruption perception is found 
to have a very small effect on voting.  
Ecker et al.’s findings are consistent with previous literature (Kayser and Wlezien 2011). 
Furthermore, they find if an individual believes new government leaders will encourage 
substantial change, they vote for the new leaders’ opposition parties. If they do not believe a new 
government will have an effect due to corruption, they vote for the incumbent party. Ecker et al 
do not attempt to mitigate the endogeneity in their corruption perception variable and treat the 
ordinal variable as continuous. In my study, I will attempt to mitigate endogeneity and account 
for the ordinal nature of the corruption perception variable. 
 Olsson (2014) uses the International Social Survey Programme survey performed in 33 
countries to study the relationship between political participation and corruption perceptions. 
Multilevel analyses are performed on each dependent variable due to the clustered data. Olson 
finds that greater perceived corruption has a strong negative effect on non-institutionalized 
participation, but no significant effect on institutionalized participation.  
 There has been a small amount of research done using the Life in Transition Survey 
(LiTS) and the effects of bribing and corruption, although no research has been done using this 
survey to specifically study the effect of corruption on voting. Ivlevs and Hinks (2015) use the 
LiTS II from 2010 to study the effects of global economic crisis on the household experience of 
bribing public officials, meaning the likelihood of people themselves giving bribes. Their 
dependent variable is binary, having paid a bribe or not, which they claim captures actual corrupt 
behavior directly. The micro-determinants of bribery that Ivleys and Hinks control for are sex, 
age groups, linguistic minority status, three education levels, income levels, and wealth. Other 
controls include employment, geographical region, and country-fixed effects. They estimate the 
probability of bribing a public official using a binary probit model and the relationship between 
being an economic crisis victim and the number of different public officials bribed with an OLS 
model.  
 Ivlevs and Hinks find that households hit by economic crisis are more likely to bribe. 
Household crises was based on the question "How much, if at all, has the economic crisis  [in 
2008] affected your household in the last two years?” A dummy variable is created for each 
possible answer, “not at all,” “just a little,” “a fair amount,” and “a great deal.” Furthermore, 
among those who do bribe, those who experienced economic crisis are more likely to bribe a 
wider range of public officials. These bribes were often paid because public officials themselves 
asked for them. Additionally, they find that wealthier households are more likely to pay bribes, 
and to a wider range of public officials. The researchers explain that “the higher opportunity 
costs of wealthier people who are willing and able to pay public officials for a quicker and better 
service, or the propensity of corruption-prone officials to target people with higher incomes” are 
possible explanations for this trend. Conclusively, the effect of crisis on bribery is strongest in 
the poorest countries and regions.  
 Hicks and Ivles (2015) face the problem of endogeneity in their crisis variable, as certain 
groups may be hit by crisis more often than others which can have an effect on bribing 
behaviors. They did not attempt to fully mitigate endogeneity due to data limitations and simply 
stated that results should be treated as conditional correlations rather than casual effects. In 
addition, there is endogeneity in their wealth variable, which asks people to rank themselves on 
an income ladder in their country. I have found an alternative for capturing wealth directly by 
using people’s net income. 
 Aghion et al. (2010) use the 2006 Life in Transition Survey for all transition and post-
communist countries and the World Values Survey to test the relationships between government 
regulation and trust. Using a simple model, they find that distrust creates more public demand for 
regulation, however, regulation discourages trust. This forms a multiple equilibrium. The 
implication is that people in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though 
they know the government is corrupt. Their model predicts that a reduction in government 
control leads to reduced output, increase in corruption, increase in the demand for government 
control, and a reduction of trust in the government in the short run. Aghion et al.’s study uses an 
old version of the Life in Transition Survey, and the authors do not include a variable for voting.  
 The topic regarding voting and corruption was made more well-known due to an earlier 
1994 paper in which Pacek tests whether the strong evidence that a relationship exists between 
economics and voter participation in established recent democracies also exists in the Eastern 
and Central European countries. Pacek discovers that economic adversity in Eastern and Central 
Europe causes citizens to abstain from voting. He uses unemployment numbers and real incomes 
to test his hypothesis. There is a variety of literature supporting Pacek’s findings that economic 
conditions can be a factor in voter turnout, which is why they are important variables to consider 
in this study’s regressions. In addition to corruption and unemployment, rising prices, and less 
provision of social services are other given reasons for voter disenchantment (Bell 2001, Mason 
2003/04, Tworzecki 2003). “Post-communist politics is, for many, marked by a sense of 
exclusion, corruption, and indeed outright criminality in some cases,” (Pacek 2009). For this 
reason, it is important to measure whether corruption does in fact influence voter turnout. 
 The overwhelming majority of literature favors the demotivating explanation for 
decreased voter turnout in a variety of regions and countries, and this paper tests whether 
corruption has a mobilizing or demotivating effect on voter turnout specifically in post-
communist countries in the EU using the lesser-explored Life in Transition Survey III. This study 
will focus on the microeconomic determinants of voter turnout and use individual corruption 
perception rather than national corruption values such as those calculated by the World Bank or 
Transparency International. A household-level study directly measures how an individual’s 
socioeconomic conditions, individual characteristics, and corruption perception influences 
whether one votes. Furthermore, while the majority of literature focuses on national voting 
patterns, my study is unique as it also measures how perceived corruption in local governments, 
from an individual’s perspective, influences whether one votes in local elections. 
3.1     MEASURING CORRUPTION  
 The dataset used in this study is the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s (ERBD) Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) III. The ERBD’s goal is to study the 
transition of countries to a market economy and to promote private and entrepreneurial 
initiatives. To do this, the bank believes it is necessary to analyze how transition has affected the 
lives of people in various regions in Eastern and Central Europe, and to consider people’s views 
of democracy, the state, and hopes for the future. The ERBD along with the World Bank has 
conducted three surveys; one in 2006, one in 2010, and the most recent in 2016. The 2016 
database was compiled by surveying 51,000 households in 34 transition countries – many of 
which are in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany, Italy, and Turkey were included for 
comparison. Overall, the survey tests life satisfaction in countries of the former communist bloc 
and includes a few Western European nations for comparison.  
 The Life in Transition Survey is a suitable data source to use for comparing the effect of 
perceived corruption on voter turnout because it asks households of former communist countries 
very detailed questions about their perception of corruption, from public to private, and from 
large to minuscule, in their country. It also asks questions regarding their voting patterns, asking 
responders whether they voted in their country’s most recent parliamentary, presidential, and 
local election, and what motivates them to vote. The survey also asks a variety of questions about 
each household’s characteristics.  
 The ERBD found that while the “happiness gap” between Eastern and Western European 
countries is converging, corruption perceptions remain high in the region of study. Still, 
corruption perception has decreased since the first survey in 2009. The ERBD (2016) found that 
16% of people made irregular payments in the health care sector and 9% of people have when 
dealing with traffic police, which the ERBD considers high. While irregular payments have 
decreased slightly since the first survey in 2006, corruption is still extremely prevalent and 
dominates reform debates in all transition countries. Corruption diminishes people’s trust in 
institutions, the government, and satisfaction with public services. Consequently, people’s trust 
in institutions has fallen since the last LiTS in 2010, as reported by the ERBD. The ERBD 
reports that only two-fifths of people have confidence in their government in transition countries. 
3.2     DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The LiTS compiles comprehensive microeconomic information about the conditions of 
each household in each country, along with opinions on the state of their country. Many of the 
exogenous control variables I use are based on Ivlevs and Hinks’ (2015) controls, although this 
study utilizes the most recent version of the LiTS from 2016 while Ivlevs and Hinks use the 
LiTS from 2010. The exogenous respondent characteristics included in the regression are a 
dummy variable for being a male, a dummy variable for being married (including not divorced or 
widowed), and a dummy variable for living in an urban area. I will also include a dummy 
variable for being a registered member of a political party, as those registered in a political party 
may have a greater incentive to vote. 
 Age is measured from from 18 to 95. As Ivlevs and Hinks have done for simplicity, I 
have categorized age into fifteen different age groups, spaced out evenly by five years with the 
exception of the 18 to 24 years old age group and the 90 and above age group. I will also include 
seven dummy variables for education: no formal education, lower secondary education, 
secondary education, post-secondary education, bachelor’s degree, tertiary education, and 
master’s degree or PHD. The left out dummy will be the one for primary education. 
 I include a dummy variable for being part an ethnic minority group in one’s country. The 
dummy variable is zero if the person is part of the majority ethnic group in their country. 
Homogeneity could mobilize people in a country to vote for similar interests unlike in more 
ethnically heterogeneous countries. Pacek (2009) claims ethnic heterogeneity could also explain 
the stakes of elections. In more ethnically heterogeneous nations, losing elections could lead to a 
permanent and large shift in the balance of power. Therefore elections in more ethnically 
heterogeneous countries could be more important to voters who want to either keep or change 
the system. If part of a minority ethnic group in a country, they could be more or less motivated 
to vote for change than the majority. 
 In addition, I added a variable for income to the regression. Income is created by using 
the question from the LiTS which asks respondents about their household’s monthly net income 
received from wages, pensions, social and family benefits, regular transfers from people outside 
the household, and any other sources. For each country, I separate the amount of people into 
quintiles to get five income groups. I will use these five income group dummies as it is the most 
accurate measure. 
 Hicks and Ivles’ (2015) use a variable for wealth which is constructed based on a 
question which asks people to rank themselves on an imaginary ten-step income ladder in their 
country. 1 is for the poorest 10% and 10 is the wealthiest 10%. Then, five dummies are added for 
the first income level, 0%-20%, second, 20%-40%, third, 40%-60%, fourth, 60%-80%, and 
finally 80%-100%. They use this variable because there was no other question in the 2010 survey 
which asks about income. Their measure of wealth is also prone to endogeneity. Luckily, the 
most recent 2016 LiTS specifically asks for a numerical value for income.  
 For the corruption variable of interest, I base it on the question which asks how many 
people in government, including the President, and Prime Minister, of each person’s country are 
corrupt. Since the corruption variables which will be described are ordinal from 1 to 4, I will 
report the results for various classifications. First, I will test for level 2, then level 2 to 3, and 
finally level 2 to 4 for the probit model to see if and how each level of perceived corruption 
influences voting behavior.  
 In the question regarding the extent of perceived corruption in the government, 1 means 
no one is corrupt, 2 means some people are corrupt, 3 means most people are corrupt, and 4 
means everyone is corrupt. Later, for comparing voter turnout in local governments, the local 
perceived corruption variable uses the same scale as the previous national corruption question, 
however it measures how many people in local governments one believes are corrupt. I will see 
if perceived corruption on a local level also has an effect on local voting patterns. At the end, I 
will test if these measures of corruption line up with how well people believe the government is 
fighting corruption; this will be the variable for corruption fighting ability. This variable is 
valued from 1 to 4, 4 meaning fighting corruption very badly, 3 meaning fairly badly, 2 meaning 
fairly well, and 1 meaning very well. Because these two variables are ordinal, I will also be using 
the cutoff method for comparison in probit models. I will not be using an ordered probit because 
the dependent variable is binary and not ordered. Figure 4 shows the distribution of corruption 
perception per country and will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
 To control for all other unobserved country-specific influences and norms on voting 
behavior, including cultural and historical, country fixed effects are included. 
 The dependent variable is a binary variable which is 1 if the person voted in their 
country’s most recent parliamentary elections, and 0 if the person did not vote. The dependent 
variable for local voting is also a binary variable which is 0 if the person did not vote in their 
most recent local government elections and 1 if the person did vote.  
 After cleaning the data of countries outside this study, I have a remaining 5688 
observations from the 11 post-communist countries of the EU. The countries have all joined in 
2004 except for Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. Regardless, at the time of 
the survey, all countries have been in the EU for at least a few years. I will include Germany and 
Italy in separate regressions for comparison mirroring all regressions used on the Eastern 
European EU countries. These two countries will be used to represent Western Europe because 
they are the only Western European countries included in the survey. 
3.3     INITIAL TESTS 
 The summary statistics for the variables in this study can be seen in Table 1. Figure 2 
shows the percentage of people which voted in their country’s most recent parliamentary 
elections, based on the LiTS responses. The country with the greatest national voter turnout is 
Slovakia at 75%, while the country with the lowest voter turnout is the Czech Republic at 55%. 
Romania had the highest local voter turnout at 81%. In the region, the overall national voter 
turnout in the most recent parliamentary elections was about 67.7%. Meanwhile, the average 
local voting was about 68.2% in the region as a whole. Eight countries have a higher local voting 
average than national, while only three have a higher national average voting. Compared to the 
east, Germany had a much larger national voter turnout at 82%. Italy, on the other hand, had a 
similar voter turnout as in the east at 70%. 
 Of the sample, 54.4% are females and 45.6% are males. The voter turnout for females is 
68% and 67.3% for males. Females and males vote at virtually the same rate in the studied 
region. Among people living in urban areas, voter turnout is 68.3% while rural voter turnout is 
66.8%. 57% of the sample lives in an urban area. Among those who are married, voter turnout is 
72.5% while those who are not married have a voter turnout of 63.1%. 
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 Among people who are ethnic minorities in their country, voter turnout is 58% while 
those of the main ethnicity in their country have a 69% voter turnout. On a local level, the 
difference between the voter turnout of the majority and minority is smaller; the majority has a 
68.7% voter turnout and minorities have a 64.5% voter turnout. Just from the preliminary tests, 
ethnic minorities seem slightly disenfranchised compared to their majority status citizens. In the 
sample 7.5% of people are ethnic minorities in their country. Among those who are not official 
members of political parties, voter turnout is 67% while among those who are official members 
of political parties, voter turnout is 85%. Only 2.8% of the people in the sample are registered as 
part of a political party. 
 I cross tabulated the voting dummy and each perceived corruption level dummy 
separately in Figure 3, both for local voting and local perceived corruption, and national voting 
and national perceived corruption. Each statistic was created by calculating how many people of 
those who perceived corruption at each of the four levels voted. For example, how many people 




















of those who perceive there to be no corruption have casted a vote. I find that as perceived 
corruption in national politics increases, voter turnout goes down across countries in this study. 
The same effect is true for local-level corruption on local voter turnout. Among people who 
believe there is no corruption in the national government, there is a 72% voter turnout compared 
to a 62% voter turnout among people who perceive all members of their government to be 
corrupt. On a local level, among people who believe there is no corruption in their local 
government, voter turnout is 71.5% compared to 59% among those who believe all members of 
their local government are corrupt. Perceived national corruption affects national voting in a 
similar matter as perceived local corruption affects local voting. 
 Figure 4 shows the distribution of corruption perception per country. Some countries 
have a very right-skewed distribution while others have a very left- skewed distribution, showing 
that some nationalities are more optimistic about the extent that corruption touches their 
government. Overall, in all countries except Poland and Slovakia, the most amount of people 
believe there is level 2 corruption in government, which means they believe some people of their 
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government are corrupt. Of the post-communist EU sample, Poland and Estonia seem to be most 
optimistic about the extent of corruption in their country. In comparison, the corruption 
perception distributions of Germany and Italy are included in the figure. While Italy’s 
distribution is similar to the distribution of some post-communist countries in this study, 
Germany has a distinct distribution. In Germany, by far, the most amount of people believe there 
is absolutely no corruption in their government. The amount of people who believe all people in 
their government are corrupt is only 1%, which is the lowest among all post-communist 
countries in this study. 
 For education, there is a clear trend. In Figure 5, one can see that each higher education 
level has a greater voter turnout than the one before it in most cases. Among people who have 
only completed primary education, voter turnout is 60% in national elections and 62% in local 
elections compared to an 84% national voter turnout and 80% local voter turnout among those 
who have a master’s degree or PHD. 























 In terms of income level, there is an interesting trend in the region, which can be seen in 
Figure 6. The fourth income quintile has the highest voter turnout, both on a local and national 
level. As income level increases, voter turnout increases too, up to the fourth quintile. The fifth 
quintile, or the top 20% of earning households, have a slightly lower voter turnout than the 
quintile before them. The top 20% of earners vote on a similar level to the middle 20% of 
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earners. The bottom 40% of earners have similar voter turnouts which is lower than that of the 
top 60% of earners. 
 A general trend exists for age. As seen in figure 7, voter turnout increases with age with 
the peak at 70 to 74 years of age. After this, voter turnout decreases in the following age groups. 
At all ages, both national and local voting follow a similar pattern. 
 While corruption and local corruption perceptions have similar distributions, the 
corruption fighting variable shows a more positive view, as the distribution is much more right 
skewed compared to the other two measures.  This can be seen in Figure 8. More people believe 
there is absolutely no corruption in national government compared to in local government, at 
around 17% and 11% respectively. At the same time, there are even more people who believe 
that absolutely everyone in their national or local government is corrupt, at 12% and 9.5% 
respectively. Only 1.5% of people in the post-communist region believe their government is 
doing a horrible job fighting corruption. 




























4.1     RESULTS  
 First, a probit model will be used on a national level, then on local level, and finally using 
the government’s perceived ability to fight corruption as the corruption variable. The difference 
between the first two is that the national level probit tests the effect of perceived corruption in the 
national government on whether one votes in national elections while the local level probit tests 
the effect of perceived corruption in the local government on whether one votes in their local 
government elections. For the probit models, because corruption, local corruption, and 
corruption fighting are ordinal variables and endogenous, I will reclassify each corruption 
variable into a single dummy variable, varying the cutoff as a robustness check. The cutoff will 
first be only level 2 (few members of government are corrupt), then 2 to 3 (few to most members 
of government are corrupt), then 2 to 4 (few to all members of government are corrupt). The 
same will be done with the corruption fighting variable and the local corruption variable.  The 
Western version of these models can be seen in Table 3. Later, a model for mitigating 
endogeneity will be introduced, shown in Table 4 and in Table 5 for the Western countries. 
Lastly, I will run a two stage least squares model, seen in Table 6, with instrumental variables 
because I justify why corruption can be treated as continuous in one circumstance. The Western 
version of this model can be seen in Table 7. The empirical models can be visually seen below. 
Probit Models in Tables 2 and 3: 
Pr(Yvote = 1 | X) = β0 + β1age + β3age2 + β4male + β5married + β6noformaledu + 
β7lowersecondary + β8secondary + β9postsecondary + β10bachelor + β11master + β12politicalparty 
+ β13ethnicminority + β14income1 + β15income2 + β16income4 + β17income5 + β18urban + 
β19(corruptionlevelcutoff) + u 
Special Regression Models in Tables 4 and 5: 
Pr(Yvote = 1 | X) = β0 + β1age + β3age2 + β4male + β5married + β6noformaledu + 
β7lowersecondary + β8secondary + β9postsecondary + β10bachelor + β11master + β12politicalparty 
+ β13ethnicminority + β14income1 + β15income2 + β16income4 + β17income5 + β18urban + 
β19(corruptionvariable = trustIV, regionalcorruptionIV) 
Two Stage Least Squares Model in Tables 6 and 7: 
Yvote = β0 + β1age + β3age2 + β4male + β5married + β6noformaledu + β7lowersecondary + 
β8secondary + β9postsecondary + β10bachelor + β11master + β12politicalparty + β13ethnicminority 
+ β14income1 + β15income2 + β16income4 + β17income5 + β18urban + β19corruption + u 
 The probit results in Table 1 show that perceived corruption has a negative, and 
significant, effect on voter turnout in post-communist countries in the EU. For the effect of 
perceived corruption in national government on national voter turnout, the corruption level 2 
only dummy in model 1 is not statistically significant, and the corruption level 2 to 3 dummy in 
model 2 is also not statistically significant. The perceived corruption dummy from level 2 to 4 in 
model 3 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that while 
perceiving few or most members of the government to be corrupt may not have an effect on 
voting, perceiving widespread corruption does have a clear effect on voting. The marginal effect 
of corruption on whether one votes is -6.6% for level 2 to 4. The difference between the marginal 
effects of the corruption 2 to 3 variable and the corruption 2 to 4 variable is -5.6%. Perhaps 
viewing some or even most members of government as corrupt is a norm in the region, which is 
why it does not affect voting behavior. However, viewing all members of governments as corrupt 
is not the norm and holding this negative opinion discourages citizens from voting. 
 A similar effect is seen on a local level, where perceived corruption in local governments 
has a negative and statistically significant effect on voter turnout. The local corruption level 2 
dummy variable is not statistically significant, however the corruption level 2 to 3 dummy 
variable in model 4 is significant at the 10% level and the corruption level 2 to 4 dummy variable 
in model 6 is significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of local corruption on whether one 
votes is 2.3% for level 2 to 3, and -4.8% for levels 2 to 4. Therefore, the difference between the 
marginal effect of the local corruption 2 to 3 variable and the corruption 2 to 4 variable is -7.1%. 
This suggests that while viewing few or most people in local government as corrupt may not 
have an effect on voting behavior, viewing all members of local governments as corrupt does 
have an effect on voting behavior. A unique pattern appears in the local model - viewing some 
members of government to be corrupt actually increases the probability of voting by 1.8%, and 
believing most members of government increases the probability of voting in local elections by 
an additional 0.53%. Limited amounts of corruption in governments does not affect citizens nor 
does it encourages them to vote for a change. However, when the most extreme level of 
perceived local government corruption was added to the model, there is a clear demotivating 
effect on voting. This is a pattern also observed by Kostadinova (2009) in which some corruption 
encourages voting, but extreme corruption discourages voting in post-communist countries. 
 When the corruption variable is instead the government’s perceived ability to fight 
corruption, the dummy variable for level 2 in model 7 and the dummy variable for level 2 to 3 in 
model 8 are statistically significant at the 1% level while the dummy variable for level 2 to 4 in 
model 9 is not significant. While the dummy variable for level 2 has a marginal effect of 6.8%, 
the dummy variable for level 2 to 3 is 3.8%. The reason the marginal effect is positive, not 
negative unlike in the other models in the table, is because level 2 in the corruption fighting 
variable means the government is doing a fairly good job fighting corruption, and is therefore a 
positive statement. Meanwhile, level 2 in the other two corruption variables was a negative 
statement - few people in government are corrupt. However, compared to the corruption level 2 
marginal effect, the marginal effect of corruption goes down when level 3 is added in model 8. 
The difference between the marginal effects is -2.9%. This marginal effect is significant, which 
means when one believes the government is doing a bad job of fighting corruption, he or she has 
a lower probability of voting in national elections. Adding the most extreme version of this 
variable to the model in model 9 is not statistically significant. Viewing just some weakness in 
the government’s ability to fight corruption is enough to discourage voting. 
 Age does positively affect voting and is significant. Each additional greater 5 year age 
group increases the likelihood of voting by about 5%. Age2 is significant at the 1% level in all 
models. While age2 is significant, the marginal effect is only about -0.17%. This suggests that the 
effect of age is slightly quadratic. Overall, as one gets older, her or she is more likely to vote. I 
used a likelihood ratio test to test whether the sets of age variables are significant in the model by 
making the restricted regression without age and comparing it to the full regression. The results 
show that age is significant to the model as a whole. The Wald test and BIC test also give the 
same results, that age is very important in the model. 
  The marginal effect of being an ethnic minority is negative and statistically significant at 
all levels in the national models, and not significant in the local level models. Ethnic minorities 
have about an 8% lower voter turnout in the national corruption models and the corruption 
fighting models. Being an ethnic minority is not statistically significant on local level voting. 
Perhaps, due to ethnic clustering on a local level. If most people in an area are the same ethnicity, 
it may not be a factor in whether one decides to vote.  
 Furthermore, if one is married, the likelihood of voting goes up by about 5% in the 
national corruption and corruption fighting models, and this is significant on the 1% level. On a 
local level, the marginal effect of being married is slightly higher at about 7%. Gender does not 
have a statistically significant effect on voting in national voting models, however is significant 
at the 10% level in the local level models. Being in a political party has a significant effect on 
voter turnout. In national elections, being part of a political party has about a 15% effect on 
voting while in local elections being part of a political party has a 10% effect on voting. 
 Living in an urban area decreases the likelihood of voting. Living in an urban area has 
about a -3% effect on voting in national elections and a -5% effect on voting in local elections. 
Perhaps people in local areas care more about the effect of election results on their localities.  
 Education in the higher levels has a significant and large marginal effect on voting. For 
the eight education dummy variables, the baseline was primary education. No formal education 
and lower secondary education did not have a statistically significant effect on voting in almost 
all models. Secondary education did have a statistically significant effect on voting, with the 
marginal effect being about 7% to 8% across models. The post-secondary dummy variable did 
not have a significant effect except in the local corruption model. The highlight of the education 
results are the significant effects of having a bachelor’s degree, tertiary education, and a master’s 
or PHD degree. Across models, having a bachelor’s degree has a marginal effect of about 14% to 
16%. Having tertiary education has about a 16% to 18% marginal effect on voting. Lastly, having 
a master’s or PHD degree has about a 22% to 26% marginal effect on voting across the models. 
Higher education of a bachelor’s or above has a large and significant effect on voting. 
 I use a likelihood ratio test to test whether the effects of the set of education dummies on 
each regression is significant for the model as a whole. I compare the restricted model without 
the education dummies to the full model, for each model. The results of the likelihood ratio test 
show that education is indeed significant in the model. The Wald test and BIC test also give the 
same results, that education is very important in the model. 
 Income level has an effect on voting. The baseline income group is the third quintile, or 
the middle 40% to 60% of earning households in each country. Compared to the middle quintile, 
being part of the top 40% of earners is not statistically significant across models. However, being 
a part of the bottom two income levels does have a slight negative and statistically significant 
effect on voting in national elections. On a local level, only being part of the bottom 20% quintile 
is statistically significant. This could be because people of each locality may have similar 
incomes, so the difference between their incomes does not have a large effect on whether they 
vote, except among the poorest. I use a likelihood ratio test to test whether the effects of the set 
of income dummies on each regression is significant for the model as a whole. I compare the 
restricted model without the income dummies to the full model, for each model. The results of 
the likelihood ratio test show that income is significant in the model. The Wald test and BIC test 
also give the same results, that income is very important in the model. 
 When the same models are run for the two Western European countries included in the 
survey, the effects of corruption were smaller. The government’s perceived corruption fighting 
ability is not significant for any cutoff at any level. Local corruption levels 2 to 3 and 2 to 4 were 
significant on local voting. Corruption level 2 and level 2 to 3 is significant for national election 
voting at the 10% level. Clearly corruption affects voting in Eastern Europe to a greater extent 
than in Western Europe. Still, these results cannot be used to represent all of Western Europe as 
there are only two countries used to represent the many countries in Western Europe. 
Furthermore, Germany and Italy do not share as many common cultural, economic, political, and 
historical characteristics as of the post-communist countries in the EU do. Finally, based on the 
summary statistics, people perceive more corruption in Italy compared to in Germany. Therefore, 
the results for the two Western European countries are provided only for the purpose of 
comparison, but may not be accurate when used to represent all of Western Europe. 
4.2     ENDOGENEITY 
 While the results in the previous section do give significant insight into the question at 
hand, there is a possible approach to the endogeneity in the corruption variable. This is the first 
study that attempts to address the endogeneity issue in respondents’ perceived corruption. 
 Endogeneity can arise if certain people are more likely to believe there is corruption due 
to other outside influences. For example, if some people have a less trusting personality, they 
could be more likely to believe that there must be corruption in their government and may 
believe it is more severe. Another reason could be that people working in certain industries may 
be exposed to more corruption and therefore have a grimmer view of their government officials. 
 1
 One way Hicks and Ivles have attempted to mitigate some endogeneity is by adding dummies for various 1
industries respondents may work in. Still, Hicks and Ivles point out that “while the inclusion of the informal work 
and industry dummies may help mitigate the endogeneity associated with omitted variables, it is not sufficient to 
claim causal effects” (Hicks and Ivles 2015). I will not attempt to model this because it would reduce the sample 
size by about half.
 To mitigate the potential endogeneity in the corruption variable, I will use an instrumental 
variable which will be a generated number. The number is calculated using the mean of 
corruption in each region multiplied by the number of observations, then each individual’s 
perceived corruption will be subtracted from the sum and this will be divided by the number of 
observations per region minus one. The reason this will serve as a valid instrument for corruption 
is because the individual is taken out of the equation and then weighed against the consensus of 
his or her geographic region. This could mitigate the endogeneity concern as people in certain 
regions may be exposed to similar conditions with similar norms which could affect a person’s 
view of corruption. Furthermore, this instrument will eliminate the possibility that one believes 
there is more corruption due to personal pessimism or a general distrusting personality. I will 
address this instrumental variable as the “regional instrumental variable.” Of course, this is not a 
completely perfect instrument either. For example, if one’s neighbor is always complaining about 
corruption, he or she will also be more inclined to believe there is corruption. Due to data 
limitations, this variable is the closest to a valid instrument. 
 Another instrumental variable for corruption was tested too, based on the question which 
asks, “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 is complete distrust while 5 is complete 
trust. Trust was used as an instrumental variable for corruption as people who are less trusting 
may also be less trusting of their government, and therefore think more members are corrupt. 
While being trusting is also an ordinal variable, the special regressor estimator described next 
allows for it. Dong and Lewbel (2015) have created the special regressor estimator for binary 
choice models with endogenous or mismeasured regressors which do not have to be continuous. 
The newest version is based on an earlier model from Dong and Lewbel (2000). Their model can 
be applied to the variables and instruments in this study, as corruption perception is endogenous 
and ordinal, and the dependent variable is binary.  
 The special regressor method has an advantage over other alternatives for endogeneity 
including maximum likelihood functions, control functions, and two stage least squares linear 
probability models. A disadvantage of using maximum likelihood functions is that it is difficult 
to specify parametric specification of how each endogenous regressor depends on instrumental 
variables and the error term. The first stage models must be parameterized correctly as well. 
Lastly, the joint likelihood function of binary dependent variables and endogenous regressors 
will have numerical problems when estimating parameters including covariances (Dong and 
Lewbel 2015). 
 Another common, but not accurate, method for mitigating endogeneity in binary choice 
models with endogenous regressors are control functions. The issue with control functions is that 
they are only valid if the endogenous regressor is continuously distributed. In this study, 
corruption perception is ordinal, not continuous, so control functions cannot be used.  
 A third common, yet also incorrect, approach to endogeneity in variables in a binary 
probit model is estimating a two stage least squares model with instrumental variables. This type 
of model does not “nest standard logit or probit models as special cases” (Dong and Lewbel 
2015) and is therefore not accurate for binary choice. Dong and Lewbel explain that signs and 
magnitudes of coefficients can be inaccurate. Another reason this model cannot be applied for 
this entire study is because corruption is not a continuous variable in all cases. 
 Dong and Lewbel’s special regressor estimator does not have any of the disadvantages of 
linear probability models, control functions, and maximum likelihood. The special regressor 
based estimators “consistently estimates beta, nests logit and probit as special cases, allows for 
general and unknown forms of heteroskedasticity (including, e.g., random coefficients), does not 
require correctly specified models of the endogenous regressors, does not require endogenous 
regressors to be continuously distributed, and does not suffer from computational convergence 
difficulties because it does not require numerical searches” (Dong and Lewbel 2015). 
 The special regressor estimator, however, requires one exogenous variable, the special 
regressor. The special regressor must be conditionally independent of the latent error terms, 
appear additively to the latent error term, and be conditionally continuously distributed with a 
large support. One special regressor is required regardless of how many endogenous variables 
are in the regression.  
 An example of this special regressor, used by Dong and Lewbel in their examples, is age. 
Dong and Lewbel point out age is a good special regressor because it is exogenous and 
continuous. One sacrifice of using the special regressor is that the special regressor, age, cannot 
also be included in the model as age2. This, however, will not have a significant effect on this 
study’s results because age2 was shown to have an extremely small marginal effect on voting, 
-0.1%, in the probit model. Furthermore, the special regressor must have a mean of zero. In order 
for the special regressor to have a positive coefficient and mean of zero, Dong and Lewbel 
suggest making the special regressor the negative of age, plus the mean of age. I will use this on 
the age variable. Dong (2010) separates age into ten equal steps. In this study we have separated 
age into fifteen equal steps. 
 Another requirement of this model is instrumental variables for the endogenous regressor. 
Dong and Lewbel’s model allow for more than one instrumental variable to be used. The 
instrumental variables used will be the regional corruption instrument and how trustful a person 
is. Due to data limitations, these were the two best instrumental variables that could be used from 
the LiTS III survey. Further investigation would be helpful. The results of running this model 
must be interpreted as marginal effects as in a probit model. 
 The results show that corruption is significant. The effect of perceived corruption in 
national governments is negative and significant at the 10% level. A similar effect is seen for the 
effect of perceived corruption in local governments on voting in local elections. The effect of the 
government’s ability to fight corruption perception on voting is not significant. The marginal 
effect of national perceived corruption on national voting is -4.1% while the marginal effect of 
local perceived corruption on local voting is -6.2%. 
 The special regressor models were also run on the two Western European countries and 
corruption was not shown to be significant at any level. This is very different from the Eastern 
European results. 
4.3     TREATING CORRUPTION AS CONTINUOUS 
 While it may initially sound incorrect to ignore the categorical properties of the 
corruption variable due to the unequal spacing between categories, Pasta (2009), Long and 
Freese (2006), and Williams (2018) make arguments for treating categorical variables as 
continuous in most instances. Pasta (2009) explains, 
 “One concern often expressed is that “we don't know that the ordinal categories are equally 
spaced.” That is true enough – we don't. But we also don't “know” that the relationship between 
continuous variables is linear, which means we don't “know” that a one-unit change in a 
continuous variable has the same effect no matter whether it is a change between two relatively 
low values or a change between two relatively high values. In fact, when it's phrased that way -- 
rather than “is the relationship linear?” -- I find a lot more uncertainty in my colleagues. It turns 
out that it doesn't matter that much in practice – the results are remarkably insensitive to the 
spacing of an ordinal variable except in the most extreme cases. It does, however, matter more 
when you consider the products of ordinal variables. 
 I am squarely in the camp that says “everything is linear to a first approximation” and therefore I 
am very cheerful about treating ordinal variables as continuous. Deviations from linearity can be 
important and should be considered once you have the basics of the model established, but it is 
very rare for an ordinal variable to be an important predictor and have it not be important when 
considered as a continuous variable. That would mean that the linear component of the 
relationship is negligible but the non-linear component is substantial. It is easy to create artificial 
examples of this situation, but they are very, very rare in practice.” 
 Long and Freese (2006) explain that the advantage is simpler interpretation, however, one 
must assume the categories of the ordinal variable are equally spaced. Long and Freese, and 
Williams explain that as long as one tests whether the assumption of linearity is justified, it is 
fine to treat ordinal variables as continuous. 
 Williams (2018) points out that the results of the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square Test and 
the AIC/BIC test will determine whether it is justified to treat an ordinal variable as continuous. 
The first model estimated is the constrained model where the ordinal variable is treated as 
continuous and the second unconstrained model treats the ordinal variable is as categorical. 
 A visual inspection of the second model, shown below suggests that the effects of 
corruption are continuous. Each coefficient is about 0.12 smaller than the coefficient before it. 
The results of the Likelihood Ratio or AIC/BIC test for the effect of national perceived 
corruption on national voting also confirm that the better fit model is the one which treats 
corruption as a continuous variable. If both of these conditions hold, Williams explains, then the 
ordinal variable can be treated as continuous. 
Table 8: Difference Between Corruption Variable Levels in National Probit Model 
—————————————————————————————————————— 
Level 2     -0.139***     
  (0.048)     
Level 3   -0.263***     
  (0.055)    
Level 4     -0.375***    
  (0.066)   
——————————————————————————————————————
Standard errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Table 9: Likelihood-Ratio Test for Corruption as Categorical and Continuous 
—————————————————————————————————— 
Likelihood Ratio χ2(2)  =      0.14 
Probability > χ2 =                  0.93 
—————————————————————————————————— 
Akaike's Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion 
—————————————————————————————————— 
       Model                  ll(null)          ll(model)       df        AIC            BIC 
—————————————————————————————————— 
     Restricted              -4114.631     -3802.58       30    7665.16       7868.70 
     Unrestricted          -4114.631     -3802.51       32     7669.03       7886.13 
—————————————————————————————————— 
 The same results for the local corruption regression and the corruption fighting regression 
suggest that the effects of corruption are not continuous, and the likelihood ratio and AIC/BIC 
test also confirm this. While it does not matter if an endogenous regressor is not continuous in 
the special regressor model, only national corruption is truly continuous. 
Table 10: Likelihood-Ratio Test for Trust as Categorical and Continuous   
——————————————————————————————————      
Likelihood Ratio χ2(3)  =      5.40 
Probability > χ2 =                  0.145 
—————————————————————————————————— 
Akaike's Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion 
—————————————————————————————————— 
       Model                  ll(null)           ll(model)      df       AIC          BIC 
—————————————————————————————————— 
     Restricted             -4114.63       -3819.46        26     7690.91     7867.31 
     Unrestricted         -4114.63       -3816.76        29      7691.51     7888.26 
—————————————————————————————————— 
 Testing the trust instrumental variable, which is also ordinal, using the AIC/BIC test 
suggests that it is fine to treat trust as a continuous variable. Assuming both the corruption 
variable and the trust instrumental variable is continuous, an additional assumption that the 
variables used fit a linear model must be made in order to run a two-stage least squares 
regression. Although Lewbel and Dong explain that two stage least square models for binary 
probit models with an endogenous regressor do not “nest standard logit or probit models as 
special cases” (Dong and Lewbel 2015), it is a common approach to endogeneity in probit 
models which I would like to test. 
 The results of the instrumental variable two stage least squares regression also suggest 
that corruption has a negative and statistically significant effect on voting to the 5% level. The 
instruments used are the same as for the special regressor - trust and the generated regional 
corruption perception instrumental variable. The effect of corruption is -5.6% for each additional 
level of corruption, which is similar to the -4.1% marginal effect of corruption in the special 
regression. Most coefficients are similar in value and significance to the respective probit model. 
This model was run on the Western countries and corruption was not significant on any level. 
5      CONCLUSION  
 With much evidence to back this up, including analysis of the microeconomic 
determinants of voting on a national and local level, using three different measures of corruption, 
and three different models, I find that corruption has a significant effect on voter turnout in post-
communist countries of the EU. Greater perceived corruption in national and local governments 
has a negative effect on voter turnout in national and local elections respectively. In the probit 
models, only a few levels of corruption are significant in Western Europe, however, most are 
significant in Eastern Europe. This suggests that perceived corruption is in fact a determinant in 
the decision vote in Eastern Europe. In the two stage least squares model treating corruption as 
continuous, corruption is not significant at any level in the two Western European countries in 
the survey, unlike in Eastern Europe where corruption has a negative effect and is significant. 
 The special regressor model also suggests that perceived corruption is significant and 
does affect both national and local voting in a negative way. When the special regressor model 
was run on the Western European countries in the study, corruption was not significant for 
national or local voting behavior. For all models used, I have shown that perceived corruption 
has a unique effect on voter turnout in post-communist countries in the EU; the same effect of 
perceived corruption on voter turnout does not arise in Western European countries.   
 The probit model results, which show that only the strongest magnitude of perceived 
corruption significantly affects voting behavior has useful policy implications. Anti-corruption 
initiatives in Eastern Europe which improve peoples’ understanding of corruption in their 
country could potentially attract more eligible voters and engage them into the political process. 
On a local level, some perceived corruption is shown to increase voter turnout while the extreme 
perceived corruption level greatly diminishes the probability of voting. 
 My findings are consistent with the majority of literature, which finds that corruption is 
negatively linked to voter turnout. Overall the results suggest that as socio-economic conditions 
improve, one is more likely to vote. Throughout recent history, the post-communist countries of 
the EU have had a unique struggle with corruption. Even as part of the EU, the countries 
continue to struggle with prevalent corruption, while voter turnout rates continue to decrease.  
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7     TABLES 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Percent  Mean  Min Max 
Ethnicity    0.127  0 1 
 0  87.06   
 1 (Minority) 12.94 
Married    48.46  0 1 
 0  51.54   
 1 (Yes)  48.46 
Education     
No Formal  0.88 
Primary  12.22 
Lower Secondary 18.76 
Secondary  34.51 
Post-Secondary  11.51 
Bachelor’s  8.60 
Tertiary   6.96 
Master’s or PHD 6.57 
Age     51.46  18 90+ 
 18-24  6.24 
 25-29  7.26 
 30-34  7.26 
 35-39  8.51 
 40-44  8.07 
 45-49  7.95 
 50-54  8.60 
 55-59  9.77 
 60-64  9.47 
 65-69  9.49 
 70-74  7.19 
 75-79  5.20 
 80-84  3.30 
 85-89  1.30 
 90+  0.39  
Gender     0.456  0 1 
 0  54.37 
 1 (Male) 45.63 
Urban     0.572  0 1 
 0 (Rural) 42.82 
 1 (Urban) 57.18 
Income Level    3.07  1 5 
1st Percentile  18.79 
2nd Percentile  19.90 
3rd Percentile  18.30 
4th Percentile  20.78 
5th Percentile  22.24 
Employed    0.615  0 1 
 0  38.52 
 1 (Yes)  61.48 
Political Party    0.028  0 1 
 0  97.22 
 1 (Yes)  2.78 
Trust     2.762  1 5 
 1  12.13 
 2  30.15 
 3  29.36 
 4  26.02 
 5  2.27 
Corruption    2.291  1 4 
 1  17.51 
 2  47.43 
 3  23.47 
 4  11.59 
Local Corruption   2.324  1 4 
 1  10.99 
 2  54.75 
 3  25.12 
 4  9.14 
Corruption Fighting   1.948  1 4 
 1  1.41 
 2  20.46 
 3  49.74 
 4  28.39 
Vote     0.677  0 1 
 0  32.35 
 1 (Yes)  67.65 
Local Vote    0.682  0 1 
 0  31.84 
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Standard errors in parentheses
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Standard errors in parentheses













Vote Local Vote Vote
Age 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.036***
Ethnic Minority -0.020 0.012 -0.025
Male 0.002 -0.011 0.002
Married -0.011 0.050 -0.024***
Education
No Formal 0.072 0.046 0.102
Primary —— —— ——
Lower Secondary 0.051*** 0.034**  0.050**
Secondary 0.084*** 0.066*** 0.113***
Post-Secondary 0.069*** 0.076*** 0.070***
Bachelor’s 0.138*** 0.128*** 0.148***
Tertiary 0.127*** 0.108*** 0.150***
Master's or PHD 0.146*** 0.124*** 0.157***
Income
1st Quintile -0.102*** -0.091*** -0.092***
2nd Quintile -0.033** -0.026* -0.044**
3rd Quintile —— —— ——
4th Quintile 0.035** 0.018 0.025
5th Quintile 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.042**
Urban -0.018* -0.015 -0.022**
Political Party 0.036 0.022 0.013
Country Fixed Effects —— —— ——
Corruption -0.041*
Local Corruption -0.062*
Table 4: Special Regressor Marginal Effects for the Post-Communist EU Countries
Corruption Fighting -0.064
Wald Test for Income 107.60 98.16 89.62
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wald Test for Education 65.35 60.35 58.63
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
Vote Local Vote Vote
Table 5: Special Regressor Marginal Effects for the Western EU Countries
Vote Local Vote Vote
Age 0.029 0.024 0.024
Ethnic Minority -0.072 -0.028 -0.069*
Male 0.011 0.03** 0.017
Married -0.047*** -0.031** -0.037***
Education
No Formal 0.044 -0.0007 0.0342
Primary —— —— ——
Lower Secondary 0.138*** 0.101*** 0.114***
Secondary 0.176*** 0.134*** 0.147***
Post-Secondary 0.194*** 0.135*** 0.152***
Bachelor’s 0.192*** 0.157*** 0.153***
Tertiary 0.217*** 0.159*** 0.174***
Master's or PHD 0.255*** 0.212*** 0.198***
Income
1st Quintile -0.028 -0.028 -0.023
2nd Quintile -0.021 -0.019 -0.003
3rd Quintile —— —— ——
4th Quintile 0.026 0.031 0.029
5th Quintile 0.038 0.025 0.031
Urban 0.017 0.002 -0.016
Political Party 0.068* 0.034 0.040




Wald Test for Income 17.53 9.30 7.79
Prob > chi2 0.0015 0.0540 0.0995
Wald Test for Education 32.12 32.25 37.07
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
























Master's or PHD 0.214***
(0.0296)
Political Party 0.122***

















Country Fixed Effects ———
Corruption -0.0557**
(0.0257)
Likelihood Ratio Test for Income 17.51
Prob > Chi2 0.0015
Likelihood Ratio Test for Education 107.73
Prob > Chi2 0.0000
Likelihood Ratio Test for Age 180.74
Prob > Chi2 0.0000
Standard errors in parenthesis 
***p<0.01   **p<0.05   * p<0.1
Vote
















































Likelihood Ratio Test for Income 26.30
Prob > Chi2 0.0000
Likelihood Ratio Test for Education 13.11
Prob > Chi2 0.0695
Likelihood Ratio Test for Age 8.08
Prob > Chi2 0.0176
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01   ** p<0.5   * p<0.1
Vote
